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 Research on intelligence led policing in general is lacking within academia but, it is 
extremely lacking in reference to intelligence led policing as a method to countering terrorism. 
There is also a lack of standardization for a uniform definition of intelligence led policing. This 
research seeks to begin to fill in the gaps in the research on intelligence led policing in academia 
but, acknowledges that further research will need to be completed on this topic in the future. This 
research aims to determine if intelligence led policing is an effective method for countering 
terrorism on local, national, and global levels, as well as on the new frontier on the internet. The 
methodology of this research utilizes data from the Global Terrorism Database and New 
America Foundation to compare incidences of terrorism before the implementation of 
intelligence led policing versus after its implementation. Data was also utilized from New 
America Foundation to compare the radicalization of jihadists online. This research found that 
while intelligence led policing may be an effective method to counter terrorism on its own, there 
are probably more significant variables that impact the method’s effectiveness than simply its 
implementation by law enforcement, such as manpower, budget, and federal government 
involvement. Further research is needed to determine if these variables, among others, may be 
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 I have served as a local law enforcement officer in the United States for approximately 
two years. From the time I was in the academy throughout my career in law enforcement, the 
buzzword in policing has been intelligence led policing. Many agencies, the agency I currently 
work for included, have policies in place to implement intelligence led policing but, do not have 
the manpower, funding, or training in place to implement such policies.  This paper examines 
whether intelligence led policing is an effective model to combat terrorism on the local, national, 
and global levels, as well as on the new frontier on the internet. What can be learned from this 
paper is whether intelligence led policing is an effective counterterrorism method and solutions 
for how it can be utilized on all levels in the global fight against terror. 
Literature Review 
Policing 
In his book, Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight 
Communities, Wilson categorized four types on law enforcement response: police invoked law 
enforcement, citizen invoked law enforcement, police invoked order maintenance, and citizen 
invoked order maintenance1. Wilson defines police invoked law enforcement as being when law 
enforcement initiate actions themselves; citizen invoked law enforcement as being when a citizen 
makes a crime complaint to initiate law enforcement action; police invoked order maintenance as 
being when law enforcement initiates actions to prevent public disorder themselves; and citizen 
invoked order maintenance as being when a citizen makes a complaint for public or private 
 





disorder2. The differences in these four types lie in criminality and who initiated action by law 
enforcement officers. Law enforcement complaints typically involve calls such as burglaries, car 
breaks, arrests, etc. while disorder complaints typically involve calls such as disturbances, 
investigations, family or neighborhood trouble etc3. Another term for police invoked actions 
would be proactive policing, while another term for citizen invoked actions would be reactionary 
policing. 
Whether proactive or reactionary, methods that focus primarily on law enforcement and 
maintaining order are viewed as more “traditional” policing methods. This contrasts with newer 
policing methods such as community-oriented policing or intelligence led policing that 
emphasize partnerships between the community and law enforcement. Community oriented 
policing relies heavily on the relationship developed between law enforcement and the 
communities they serve. It emphasizes the use of this relationship by law enforcement to 
proactively solve crimes and address issues in the community. It is believed that by building a 
positive relationship with the community, citizens are more likely to work with and offer 
information to law enforcement to reduce crime rates. Intelligence led policing is a policing 
method that was developed in the United Kingdom and widely adopted by local law enforcement 
agencies in the United States following the attacks on 9/11. Intelligence led policing is the 
utilization of intelligence to analyze trends in the community’s local law enforcement agencies 
serve in order to reduce crime. While intelligence led policing is used for a variety of crimes, 
there is a strong homeland security element that emphasizes utilization of police intelligence to 








reacting to calls for service or events in their area of responsibility. While this can make up a 
large portion of police work, it is the least favorable policing method because there is a lack of 
proactivity. Without proactivity and creating relationships with the community, such as those 
utilized in community oriented policing and intelligence led policing, it becomes more difficult 
to solve crimes in general. 
Community oriented policing relies heavily on the relationship between local law 
enforcement agencies and their local communities. As one could imagine, in many communities, 
this relationship is particularly strained. Many members of the community not only have a poor 
working relationship with local law enforcement agencies, but they fear retribution from other 
members of their community as well – such as gangs and other prominent groups4.  
It should be noted that community oriented policing faces similar criticisms as 
intelligence led policing. Community oriented policing is similarly vague and even more difficult 
to measure5. Community oriented policing also does not have a national standard for its 
implementation, which allows the local law enforcement agencies that implement it to 
implement it to varying degrees6. It should also be noted that there has been limited empirical 
research on the effectiveness of community oriented policing for these reasons7. Similarly, there 
has been limited to no empirical research conducted on the effectiveness of community oriented 
policing as a counter terrorism method8.  
 
4 Lieberman, Charles Andrew. 2009. “Community Policing & Counter Terrorism: Community Policing Philosophy as 









A focus group study found there was both community and law enforcement agency 
support for community oriented policing as a counter terrorism method9. However, this study did 
not provide a comparison of community oriented policing and intelligence led policing to the 
focus group. The study also did not measure the attitudes of the participants on intelligence led 
policing as a counter terrorism method in order to compare levels of support.  
Community oriented policing relies too heavily on the relationship between local law 
enforcement agencies and the communities they serve. Community oriented policing also faces 
the issue of overemphasizing the desires of the community being served. In some cases, residents 
are even being asked to tell law enforcement how to prioritize certain issues in their community, 
such as in the neighborhood policing variant of community oriented policing in the United 
Kingdom10. Taking into consideration that community oriented policing is a more decentralized 
law enforcement method compared to a centralized method, such as intelligence led policing, 
this makes it difficult to implement as a counter terrorism method and unreliable.  
That being said, both community oriented policing and intelligence led policing are both 
preferable to reactionary policing. Reactionary policing is when police wait to react for calls for 
service instead of proactively making connections with the communities they serve. This entails 
random motorized patrols and limited interaction with the local community11. This is in a stark 
contrast to both the community oriented policing and intelligence led policing methods. As 
demonstrated by rising crime rates throughout the Five Eyes Community, reactionary policing is 
 
9 Ibid. 







ineffective12. While local law enforcement agencies still react to call for service, this alone is not 
enough to prevent crimes or terrorism from occurring. 
Proponents of Intelligence Led Policing 
Academia generally views intelligence led policing as being an effective policing 
method, even when used to counter terrorism. In fact, many believe it is the natural method to 
counter terrorism on the home front13. However, while it may seem as the natural method, 
smaller agencies tend to lack the resources to effectively implement intelligence led policing. 
The implementation of intelligence led policing and distribution of resources are primarily 
decisions made on the administration level of law enforcement agencies. Carter, Phillips, and 
Gayadeen indicated that agency size is unrelated to decision making14. In loose coupling theory, 
it is believed that organizations are split into superordinate and subordinate levels in which the 
superordinate level is comprised of supervisors who “maintain institutional legitimacy”, while 
the subordinate level is comprised of “institutional actors” who follow the superordinate’s 
“prescription” for the agency15. Even though both of these levels are linked, they still maintain 
some level of autonomy from the other16. Through the use of loose coupling theory, they 
determined that either all law enforcement agencies in the United States utilize intelligence when 
making decisions, or none of them do17. 
Criticisms of Intelligence Led policing 
 
12 Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2002. “Intelligence-led policing and the problems of turning rhetoric into practice.” 
Policing and Society 12:1 53-66. 
13 Weaver, Sue Diane. 2014. “Thinking Outside the Box: Melding Community Policing with  Homeland 
Security Law Operations.” Journal of Law Enforcement 4: 1-7 
14 Carter, Jeremy G., Scott W. Phillips, and S. Marlon Gayadeen. 2014. “Implementing Intelligence-Led Policing: An 
Application of Loose-Coupling Theory.” Journal of Criminal Justice 42: 433-442 







The status quo in academia on the topic of intelligence led policing seems to be that it is a 
largely effective policing method. However, many note that there is no true definition of 
intelligence led policing, or that the definitions of intelligence led policing are far too vague to be 
accurately measured18 19 20. It has also been noted by multiple authors that there is extremely 
limited data on intelligence led policing in general, even before consideration of the policing 
method being applied to counter terrorism21 22 23 24. Thus, it appears that there is not any 
evidence to support the implementation of intelligence led policing generally, or to counter 
terrorism25. 
Another major criticism of intelligence led policing in the United States is that it is 
resource intensive. The majority of local law enforcement agencies in the United States do not 
have the staff or resources available to implement intelligence led policing26 27. It has also been 
shown that it is difficult for smaller law enforcement agencies to establish an intelligence liaison 
 
18 Alach, Zhivan. 2011. “The Emperor is Still Naked: How Intelligence-Led Policing Has Repackaged Common 
Sense as Transcendental Truth.” The Police Journal 84: 75-97 
19 Hengst-Bruggeling, Marielle Den, Bart De Graaf, and Peter Van Scheepstal. 2014. “Modelling intelligence-led 
policing to identify its potential.” European Journal of Policing Studies 1:171-191 
20 Oliver, Willard M.. 2009. “Policing for Homeland Security Policy and Research.” Criminal Justice Policy 
Review 20: 253-260 
21 Carter, Jeremy G., Scott W. Phillips, and S. Marlon Gayadeen. 2014. “Implementing Intelligence-Led Policing: 
An Application of Loose-Coupling Theory.” Journal of Criminal Justice 42: 433-442 
22 Hengst-Bruggeling, Marielle Den, Bart De Graaf, and Peter Van Scheepstal. 2014. “Modelling intelligence-led 
policing to identify its potential.” European Journal of Policing Studies 1:171-191 
23 Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. “Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for 
Countering the Terrorism Threat.” The Homeland Security Review 7: 265-283 
24 McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermark. 2007. “Intelligence-Led Policing As a 
Framework for Responding to Terrorism.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 23: 142-158 
25 Alach, Zhivan. 2011. “The Emperor is Still Naked: How Intelligence-Led Policing Has Repackaged Common 
Sense as Transcendental Truth.” The Police Journal 84: 75-97 
26 Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. “Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in 
the USA.” Policing and Society 25: 333-357 
27 Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. “Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for 





officer, much less a dedicated intelligence unit, due to the lack of funding available28.The federal 
government may need to provide resources and training to local law enforcement agencies in 
order to make the nationwide implementation of intelligence led policing possible29. It should 
also be noted, however, that the issues of lack of training and understanding were echoed by 
other Five Eyes partners with more centralized law enforcement structures, such as New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom30 31. As pointed out by Ratcliffe as well, is that the members of the Five 
Eyes Community also suffer from a lack of commonality between their technologies, which 
prevents the standardization of the intelligence led policing method both within and between 
states32.        
Furthermore, a single, nationwide, standard has not been set for the implementation of 
intelligence led policing in the United States33. The Bush administration did set forth minimum 
national training requirements following 9/11, such as learning the National Incident 
Management System and the Incident Command System34. Once again, however, it was found 
that even though most local law enforcement agencies had an emergency response plan, many 
still did not have intelligence officers – nor did they intend to hire any in the future35.  
 
28 McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermark. 2007. “Intelligence-Led Policing As a 
Framework for Responding to Terrorism.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 23: 142-158 
29 Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. “Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in 
the USA.” Policing and Society 25: 333-357 
30 Burcher, Morgan and Chad Whelan. 2019. “Intelligence-Led Policing in Practice: Reflections From Intelligence 
Analysts.” Police Quarterly 22:2 139-160. 
31 Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2005. “The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand Case Study.” Police 
Practice and Research 6:5 435-451. 
32 Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2002. “Intelligence-led policing and the problems of turning rhetoric into practice.” Policing and 
Society 12:1 53-66. 
33 Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. “Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for 
Countering the Terrorism Threat.” The Homeland Security Review 7: 265-283 
34 Oliver, Willard M.. 2009. “Policing for Homeland Security Policy and Research.” Criminal Justice Policy 






Other key criticisms of intelligence led policing are the increased potential for biased 
based policing and the overshadowing of other serious crimes. The main criticism of intelligence 
led policing and the potential for biased policing stems from civil rights issues36. It is argued that 
law enforcement agencies are faced with the difficult challenge of both implementing 
intelligence led policing and not infringing upon the constitutional rights of American citizens37. 
The main criticism of intelligence led policing overshadowing of other serious crimes is that 
when intelligence led policing is focused on terrorism, this focus overshadows all other serious 
crimes38. It is believed that if the intelligence led policing model focused on all serious crimes in 
general, the life support for terror attacks would be cut off due to lack of resources available for 
the counter terrorism effort39. It should be noted that both Jackson and Prunckun believe that 
once these two criticisms have been overcome, intelligence led policing would be effective40 41.   
It has also been noted by multiple authors that there is extremely limited data on intelligence led 
policing in general, even before consideration of the policing method being applied to counter 
 
36 Jackson, Arrick L. and Michael Brown. 2007. “Ensuring Efficiency, Interagency Cooperation, and Protection of 
Civil Liberties: Shifting from a Traditional Model of Policing to an Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) Paradigm.” 
Criminal Justice Studies 20: 111-129 
37 Jackson, Arrick L. and Michael Brown. 2007. “Ensuring Efficiency, Interagency Cooperation, and Protection of 
Civil Liberties: Shifting from a Traditional Model of Policing to an Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) Paradigm.” 
Criminal Justice Studies 20: 111-129 
38 Prunckun, Henry. 2016. “The Paradox of Fiction and Terrorism’s Overshadowing of Organised Crime as a Law 
Enforcement Concern.” Salus Journal 4: 62-81 
39 Ibid. 
40 Jackson, Arrick L. and Michael Brown. 2007. “Ensuring Efficiency, Interagency Cooperation, and Protection of 
Civil Liberties: Shifting from a Traditional Model of Policing to an Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) Paradigm.” 
Criminal Justice Studies 20: 111-129 
41 Prunckun, Henry. 2016. “The Paradox of Fiction and Terrorism’s Overshadowing of Organised Crime as a Law 





terrorism42 43 44 45. In the Five Eyes Community, it appears that the only state that has 
documented their intelligence led policing is the United Kingdom, making it difficult to measure 
the effectiveness of intelligence led policing in the Five Eyes member states46. Thus, it appears 
that there is not any evidence to support the implementation of intelligence led policing 
generally, or to counter terrorism47. 
Intelligence Led Policing and Homegrown Terrorism 
When implementing the intelligence led policing model, local law enforcement agencies 
stress the importance of the relationship between the community and law enforcement officers48. 
Some believe that this relationship is the key to combatting homegrown terrorism in the United 
States49. In the United States, where domestic terrorist attacks outnumber international terrorist 
attacks by a ratio of 7-to-1, intelligence led policing should be effective in countering 
homegrown terrorism50. This same community involvement, however, has been criticized for 
inhibiting the intelligence led policing method from being implemented due to the community 
and law enforcement agency disconnect51. This relationship makes it difficult to separate the 
 
42 Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. “Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in the 
USA.” Policing and Society 25: 333-357. 
43 Hengst-Bruggeling, Marielle Den, Bart De Graaf, and Peter Van Scheepstal. 2014. “Modelling intelligence-led 
policing to identify its potential.” European Journal of Policing Studies 1:171-191. 
44 Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. “Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for Countering 
the Terrorism Threat.” The Homeland Security Review 7: 265-283. 
45 McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermark. 2007. “Intelligence-Led Policing As a Framework 
for Responding to Terrorism.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 23: 142-158. 
46 Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2005. “The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand Case Study.” Police 
Practice and Research 6:5 435-451. 
47 Alach, Zhivan. 2011. “The Emperor is Still Naked: How Intelligence-Led Policing Has Repackaged Common Sense 
as Transcendental Truth.” The Police Journal 84: 75-97. 
48 Carter, Jeremy G. and David L. Carter. 2012. “Law enforcement intelligence: implications for self-radicalized 
terrorism.” Police Practice and Research 13: 138-154 
49 Ibid. 
50 McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermark. 2007. “Intelligence-Led Policing As a 
Framework for Responding to Terrorism.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 23: 142-158 





needs and wants of the community from those of the law enforcement agency52. It is believed 
this could be overcome by keeping the community informed on the utilization of intelligence in 
the decision making processes of the law enforcement agency53. 
Intelligence Led Policing and Fusion Centers 
The purpose of fusion centers after 9/11 was to provide transparency and ease 
communications between agencies that have intelligence information. However, restricting 
intelligence operations only out of fusion centers limits the ability of agencies to gather and share 
intelligence54. In their research on intelligence led policing, Telep, Ready, and Bottema revealed 
that fusion centers ultimately benefit law enforcement agencies by creating a framework for 
intelligence sharing between different agencies55. Unfortunately, law enforcement officers rarely 
receive intelligence from the fusion centers, even though patrol officers would benefit the most 
from the information56. Furthermore, the same patrol officers who would benefit the most from 
this information often lack training on how to contact the fusion center to access, or distribute 
information, as well as how to use the intelligence received from the fusion center on the road. 
The utilization of these fusion centers was designed to allow agencies that have limited resources 
to implement intelligence led policing effectively57. Instead, local law enforcement agencies are 
some of the least likely to utilize fusion centers. In fact, federal agencies are more than eight 
times more likely than other law enforcement agencies to utilize fusion centers58. Another key 




54 Telep, Cody W., Justin Ready, and Johannes Bottema. 2017. “Working Towards Intelligence Led Policing: The 
Phoenix Police Department Intelligence Officer Program.” Oxford University Press 12: 332-343 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Lewandowski, Carla, Jeremy G. Carter, and Walter L. Campbell. 2017. “The Utility of Fusion Centers to 






focused on major urban areas. As such, local law enforcement agencies that are located in urban 
areas are more likely to utilize fusion centers that those located in rural areas59. While this 
certainly offers potential benefits to urban areas like New York, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, 
Chicago, and Orlando – agencies which are discussed late in this paper – it allows rural agencies 
to slip through the cracks. This is especially problematic when rural law enforcement agencies 
already have limited or no capacity to implement intelligence led policing due to a lack of 
manpower, funds, training, and resources 60 61 62 63.  
A model that may be more effective than the use of fusion centers is the one that was 
implemented by the Phoenix Police Department. The Phoenix Police Department chose six 
patrol officers on shift in its Mountain View Precinct to train as intelligence officers64. These 
new intelligence officers on patrol were then able to go to active calls to distribute intelligence 
from the responding officers on scene or collect intelligence from them to distribute to the rest of 
the department, as well as agencies at the local, state, and federal levels65. This program showed 
high levels of support from its agency, but its effectiveness in reducing crime rates or countering 
terrorism were not measured66. This model is more cost effective as law enforcement agencies 
would only have to select a few members of their agency to become dually trained, instead of 
hiring sworn law enforcement officers and non-sworn civilians as analysts. This method is likely 
 
59 Ibid. 
60 Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. “Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in 
the USA.” Policing and Society 25: 333-357 
61 Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. “Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for 
Countering the Terrorism Threat.” The Homeland Security Review 7: 265-283 
62 McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermark. 2007. “Intelligence-Led Policing As a 
Framework for Responding to Terrorism.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 23: 142-158 
63 Oliver, Willard M.. 2009. “Policing for Homeland Security Policy and Research.” Criminal Justice Policy 
Review 20: 253-260 
64 Telep, Cody W., Justin Ready, and Johannes Bottema. 2017. “Working Towards Intelligence Led Policing: The 







to be more effective in the overall implementation of intelligence led policing as it eliminates the 
disconnect between patrol officers and fusion centers. Although, it should be noted that research 
has not yet been conducted on a comparative level between The Phoenix Police Department 
model and the Fusion Center model. This is a topic that should be explored by future research. 
Intelligence Led Policing in the Five Eyes Community 
 Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the intelligence led policing model was 
widely accepted by local law enforcement agencies across the United States. As such, the United 
States’ Department of Justice endorsed the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, which 
calls on all United States law enforcement agencies – federal, state, and local – to develop and 
implement an intelligence led policing framework67. However, intelligence led policing has been 
implemented throughout the Five Eyes Community over the course of differing time periods. For 
example, intelligence led policing began in the United Kingdom prior to 9/11 and like the United 
States, it has developed the National Intelligence Model, promoting intelligence led policing68 69. 
The difference between the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s models is that the United 
Kingdom requires by law that law enforcement agencies in their country will implement the 
National Intelligence Model70. Within the Five Eyes Community, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States all implement intelligence led policing 
 
67 McGarrell, Edmund F., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven Chermark. 2007. “Intelligence-Led Policing As a Framework 
for Responding to Terrorism.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 23: 142-158. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2005. “The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand Case Study.” Police 






within their law enforcement agencies71 72. Canada has even been at the forefront of intelligence 
led policing with the use of GIS systems to support their local law enforcement’s intelligence 
capacity, such as with their Waterloo Region Police Service and the Vancouver Police 
Department73. This allows Canada to proactively analyze and prevent crime, a concept that may 
spread to other Five Eyes partners74. 
Criticisms of Intelligence Led policing 
While academia seems to generally agree that intelligence led policing seems to be a 
larely effective policing method, many not that there is no true definition of intelligence led 
policing, or that the definitions of intelligence led policing are far too vague to be measured75 76 
77. It has also been noted by multiple authors that there is extremely limited data on intelligence 
led policing in general, even before consideration of the policing method being applied to 
counter terrorism78 79 80 81. In the Five Eyes Community, it appears that the only state that has 
documented their intelligence led policing is the United Kingdom, making it difficult to measure 
 
71 Burcher, Morgan and Chad Whelan. 2019. “Intelligence-Led Policing in Practice: Reflections From Intelligence 
Analysts.” Police Quarterly 22:2 139-160. 
72 Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2005. “The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand Case Study.” Police 
Practice and Research 6:5 435-451. 
73 Herchenrader, Tegan and Steven Myhill-Jones. 2015. “GIS supporting intelligence-led policing.” Police Practice 
and Research 16:2 136-147. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Alach, Zhivan. 2011. “The Emperor is Still Naked: How Intelligence-Led Policing Has Repackaged Common Sense 
as Transcendental Truth.” The Police Journal 84: 75-97. 
76 Hengst-Bruggeling, Marielle Den, Bart De Graaf, and Peter Van Scheepstal. 2014. “Modelling intelligence-led 
policing to identify its potential.” European Journal of Policing Studies 1:171-191 
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the effectiveness of intelligence led policing in the Five Eyes member states82. Thus, it appears 
that there is not any evidence to support the implementation of intelligence led policing 
generally, or to counter terrorism83. 
Another major criticism of intelligence led policing in the United States is that it is very 
resource intensive. The majority of local law enforcement agencies in the United States do not 
have the staff or resources available to implement intelligence led policing84 85. It has also been 
shown that it is difficult for smaller law enforcement agencies to establish an intelligence liaison 
officer, much less a dedicated intelligence unit, due to the lack of funding available86. As such, 
many local law enforcement agencies in the United States view the implementation of 
intelligence led policing as an “unfunded mandate” by the federal government87. The federal 
government may need to provide resources and training to local law enforcement agencies in 
order to make the nationwide implementation of intelligence led policing more possible88. It 
should be noted, however, that the issues of lack of training and understanding were echoed by 
other Five Eyes partners with more centralized law enforcement structures, such as New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom89 90. As pointed out by Ratcliffe as well, is that the members of the Five 
 
82 Ratcliffe, Jerry. 2005. “The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand Case Study.” Police 
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Eyes Community also suffer from a lack of commonality between their technologies, which 
prevents the standardization of the intelligence led policing method both within and between 
states91.  
Furthermore, a single, nationwide, standard has not been set for the implementation of 
intelligence led policing in the United States, nor in other Five Eyes member states92 93. The 
Bush administration did set forth minimum national training requirements following 9/11, such 
as learning the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System94. 
Once again, however, it was found that even though most local law enforcement agencies had an 
emergency response plan, many still did not have intelligence officers – nor did they intend to 
hire any in the future95.  
Other key criticisms of intelligence led policing are the increased potential for biased 
based policing and the overshadowing of other serious crimes. The main criticism of intelligence 
led policing and the potential for biased based policing stems from civil rights issues96. It is 
argued that law enforcement agencies are faced with the difficult challenge of both implementing 
intelligence led policing and not infringing upon the civil rights of citizens97. It should be noted 
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that both Jackson and Prunckun believe that once potential civil rights violations have been 
overcome, intelligence led policing would be effective98 99.         
Types of Social Media Platforms Utilized by the Islamic State 
 The Islamic State’s internet mujahideen seeks to fulfill their electronic jihad on both 
centralized and decentralized social media platforms100. The majority of Western citizens are 
aware of their utilization of centralized social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
lesser known Telegram, where the group was well known for posting gory propaganda videos 
and engaging in hashtag hijacking to promote their cause101. However, the Islamic State is also 
active on less popular websites, that are generally unknown to the Western public, such as 
RocketChat and ZeroNet that operate on decentralized data stores102. The difference between 
centralized and decentralized social media platforms is simple in that the developers of 
decentralized social media platforms lack the ability to act against content that is stored on 
servers operated by their users or that are distributed amongst their user community103. In 
contrast, social media platforms with centralized data stores  can take action against such 
content, as frequently observed by their users when platforms remove social media posts or ban 
user accounts for content104. The downfall of the utilization of decentralized social media 
platforms by the internet mujahideen is that their content can only reach people who have 
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registered to the platform it is distributed on, therefore their content fails to reach a wide base of 
public viewership from target populations such as those in the West105.  
 Telegram is uniquely favored among platforms that utilize centralized data stores due to 
its implementation of end-to-end data encryption of its users’ chat conversations106. This feature 
has led to the Islamic State favoring Telegram to distribute “official” content and plan terrorist 
attacks107. However, Telegram possesses a pitfall similar to decentralized social media platforms 
in that many groups require users to be invited to their chats in order to view content108. As such, 
leadership from the Islamic State has discouraged ISIS members from isolating themselves on 
platforms like Telegram due to the lack of public viewership they provide.  
 However, even though a hallmark characteristic of ISIS is their utilization of social media 
to distribute propaganda, in 2017, Islamic State leadership issued a decree that banned its 
members from utilizing social media platforms to disseminate information and recruit due to 
mounting paranoia over infiltration and tracking by foreign intelligence agencies on the 
internet109. Although such a decree demonstrates their suspicion of Western governments, it does 
not appear to have been effective in preventing users from posting content in pursuit of 
“electronic jihad”. 
Consumers of Islamic State Propaganda on Social Media Platforms 
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 Between October and November of 2014 alone, there were approximately 46,000 Twitter 
accounts that supported the Islamic State110. The ISIS Twitter Census utilized open source 
research to geo-locate ISIS supporting Twitter accounts111. It should be noted that this data only 
takes into consideration Twitter user accounts that are location enabled112. Therefore, the total 
number of Twitter accounts that supported the Islamic State during this period it likely larger in 
various geographic areas113. The largest overall geographic area for location enabled Twitter 
accounts that support the Islamic State accounted for Iraq and Syria, predominantly in Islamic 
State controlled areas114. It should also be noted that of the location enabled Twitter accounts that 
support the Islamic State, none of them were from the United States and those from other 
Western states only accounted for single digit percentages115. However, based on the location 
provided in the Twitter accounts sampled for the Twitter Census, the number of location enabled 
accounts from Iraq and Syria were consistent with the location information provided in users’ 
profiles, while the United States and the United Kingdom were the predominant locations of 
users from Western states116.  
 Even though sources like the Twitter Census provide important insights into accounts on 
social media platforms that support the Islamic State, it is important to take into consideration 
that the supporters on each platform only account for a portion of overall supporters for the 
Islamic State. For example, the Twitter Census only surveys the user accounts on the social 
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media platform Twitter, as the name of the study suggests117. However, certain populations 
prefer certain social media platforms over others. Tunisia is one example of this occurrence due 
to their population generally preferring the social media platform Facebook to Twitter118. In fact, 
in 2013, there were 300 Facebook accounts to every one Twitter account that belonged to 
Tunisian users119. This also fails to account for users located on other social media platforms, 
with both centralized and decentralized stores, such as Telegram and TikTok, that Islamic State 
supporting users have migrated to120.  
The Islamic State on Social Media and Foreign Fighters 
 The Internet has steadily influenced the radicalization of jihadists and foreign fighters 
since 9/11121. In fact, the percentage of jihadists that were radicalized online since 9/11 is 51%. 
Even more disturbing is that since 2013, the number of jihadists that were radicalized online has 
only increased122. The cases from 2013-2019 comprise 53% of the total cases since 9/11123. 
Furthermore, since 2014, the yearly percentage of jihadists radicalized online has been greater 
than the average percentage124. However, while this dataset measures the total number of 
jihadists that have been radicalized online, it does not specify the number of foreign fighters that 
have been radicalized online. 
 Moreover, another dataset from the New America Foundation indicates that 
approximately one third of their sample of foreign fighters were radicalized online or actively 
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participated in online jihadist groups125. This is particularly common with women who conspire 
to join the Islamic State from Western states as ISIS Brides, such as Hoda Muthana and Shannon 
Conley126 127. As a result, women account for 1 in 7 of Western foreign fighters sampled by New 
America that joined the Islamic State128. 
Criticisms of the Literature 
While the studies have been conducted have provided a quantitative value to the topic of 
intelligence led policing, these surveys were flawed. The key flaw is that these surveys were not 
addressed to patrol129 130. Instead they focused on administration, detectives, sergeants, and 
crimes analysts131 132. By doing so, they failed to receive responses from the law enforcement 
officers that potentially rely on and distribute intelligence information on a daily basis. One 
survey only received responses from four medium sized law enforcement agencies133. The other 
survey received responses from more law enforcement agencies, but the majority of them came 
from large agencies in the Midwest134. Osborn’s survey also only asked open ended interview-
like questions which could not be accurately coded or quantified135. 
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Chapter 1: Intelligence Led Policing in Countering Terrorism in the United States 
Introduction 
Intelligence led policing has been a buzz phrase for law enforcement agencies across the 
United States following the events of September 11, 2001. The conventional wisdom that was 
developed from those events was that local law enforcement agencies are the first line of defense 
against acts of terror. However, it also seemed that there was a lack of communication and 
transparency not only between federal agencies, but local law enforcement agencies as well. In 
an attempt to prevent future acts of terror in the United States, local law enforcement agencies 
began implementing intelligence led policing in their efforts to fight crime and terrorism in their 
communities. This paper analyzes whether intelligence led policing is an effective method to 
counter terrorism. 
Methodology 
To assess if intelligence led policing is an effective counterterrorism option in the United 
States, I conducted a comparative case study of five American local law enforcement agencies. 
The agencies selected for this case study were the New York Police Department (NYPD), Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD), Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), 
Chicago Police Department (CPD), and Orlando Police Department (OPD). These agencies were 
selected for this study to provide a sample population that was geographically distributed across 
the United States.  
For this case study of the five police departments, I used the University of Maryland’s 





terrorist attacks that occurred worldwide from 1970-2017136. The data samples for this case study 
were from 1982 to 1999 and 2000 to 2017. The data was broken at 1999/2000 as intelligence led 
policing did not truly come into fruition in the United States as a policing or countering terrorism 
method until after the attacks on 9/11.  
Case Study 
 For this case study, five local law enforcement agencies were selected from different 
areas of the United States in order to provide a diverse representation of law enforcement 
agencies that implemented intelligence policing. The law enforcement agencies selected – New 
York City Police Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department, Chicago Police Department, and Orlando Police Department – are large agencies in 
major urban areas. Local law enforcement agencies in rural areas are currently being excluded 
due to their lack of information reporting on intelligence led policing use and data.  
The agencies selected represent varying department sizes and varying employee numbers. 
As stated in the literature review, local law enforcement agencies are less likely to implement 
intelligence led policing because their staffing is already inadequate137 138. Consequently, agency 
size will be discussed in terms of number of employees at the agencies, both sworn and non-
sworn civilians. The distinction between sworn and civilian employees is important because 
local law enforcement agencies frequently hire non-sworn civilians as analysts for intelligence 
led policing functions instead of training their sworn officers in an intelligence capacity. 
 
136 “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)”. 2018. Global Terrorism 
Database [Data file] https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd  
137 Carter, Jeremy G. and Scott W. Phillips. 2015. “Intelligence-led policing and forces of organisational change in 
the USA.” Policing and Society 25: 333-357 
138 Jensen III, Carl J., James L. Regens, and Natalie Griffin. 2013. “Intelligence-Led Policing as a Tool for 





New York City Police Department 
 The New York City Police Department (NYPD) is one of the most well-known local law 
enforcement agencies in the United States. The NYPD has approximately 55,000 employees – 
36,000 sworn and 19,000 civilians139. They serve a city of approximately 8.5 million people and 
consisting of 77 precincts140. New York City had approximately 65.2 million tourists in 2018141. 
The NYPD has a budget of $5.6 Billion142. The New York City Police Department has a 
dedicated Intelligence Bureau that implements intelligence led policing143. It should be noted that 
the NYPD did not create its Intelligence Bureau until after the 9/11 attacks144. A key component 
of the intelligence bureau is the Field Intelligence Officer program which allows chosen 
uniformed officers to “collect and disseminate” information to their respective precincts145. The 
NYPD intelligence bureau also has an international liaison program which allows the agency to 
station officers in different law enforcement agencies around the world to support their 
intelligence function146. 
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The NYPD also has a Counter Terrorism Bureau aimed at preventing terrorism on the 
local law enforcement level147. The Counter Terrorism Bureau has its own Terrorism Threat 
Analysis Group that analyzes and distributes intelligence related to terrorism148. In 2016, the 
Counter Terrorism Bureau had more than 525 employees dedicated to the prevention of 
terrorism149. The Counter Terrorism Bureau also houses their Joint Terrorist Task Force that 
works with their local fusion center150. The changes made to the agency by the NYPD following 
9/11 set the bar for local law enforcement agencies around the country. Many local law 
enforcement agencies, especially those in major urban areas, began to implement similar changes 
and intelligence led policing. 
Los Angeles Police Department 
 The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is another well-known law enforcement 
agency in the United States. The LAPD has approximately 12,857 employees – 9,988 sworn and 
2,869 civilians151. They serve a city of approximately 4,007,147 people152. Los Angeles had 50 
million tourists in 2018153. The LAPD has budget of $1.6 Billion154. The LAPD has a dedicated 
intelligence investigations section within their Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau 
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that implements intelligence led policing155. The LAPD Counter-Terrorism bureau was last 
reported to have approximately 300 employees dedicated to its mission156. The Counter-
Terrorism bureau has implemented a terrorism liaison officer program that allows officers to 
collect data on possible local terrorist threats and the bureau utilizes their local fusion center157. 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
 The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) became more well known 
following the Las Vegas Shooting in 2017. The LVMPD has approximately 5,379 employees – 
3,563 sworn and 1,816 civilians158. They serve a city of approximately 1,627,244 people159. Las 
Vegas had 42,116,800 tourists in 2018160. LVMPD has a budget of $601,072,198161. The Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has a dedicated Homeland Security Division that 
implements intelligence led policing and actively utilizes their local fusion center, Southern 
Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center162.  
Chicago Police Department 
 The city of Chicago is well known for its high crime rates and the Chicago Police 
Department (CPD) is also well known as a result. The CPD has approximately 13,566 employees 
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– 12,383 sworn and 1,183 civilians163. They serve a city of approximately 2,706,171 people164. 
Chicago had 57.6 million tourists in 2018165. The CPD has a budget of CPD: $1.492 Billion166. 
The Chicago Police Department has its own dedicated fusion center which handles their 
intelligence operations and is housed in their Deployment Operations Section167. Along with the 
use of their fusion center, the Chicago Police Department has mostly used intelligence led 
policing in their efforts to reduce gun violence in their communities168. 
Orlando Police Department 
 The Orlando Police Department (OPD) became more well known following the Pulse 
Night Club shooting 2016. The OPD has approximately 926 employees – 714 sworn and 212 
civilians169. They serve a city of approximately 283,982 people170. Orlando had 75 million 
tourists in 2018171. The OPD has a budget of $175,792,908172. The Orlando Police Department 
has a dedicated intelligence unit housed by their Violent Crimes Initiative, which handles their 
intelligence operations. However, the Orlando Police Department recently decided to restructure 
 
163 FBI. 2017. “Table 78.” Crime in the United States https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/ crime-in-the-u.s.-
2017/tables/table-78/table-78.xls/view 
164 Ibid. 
165 Rackl, Lori. January 2019. “Chicago sets new tourism record with nearly 58 million visitors in 2018 — and the 
mayor is thrilled.” The Chicago Tribune https://www.chicagotribune.com/travel/ct-trav-chicago-tourism-record-
numbers-2018-0111-story.html 
166 Mayor Rahm Emanuel. 2018. “2018 Budget Recommendations.” City of Chicago https://
 www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/obm/supp_info/2018Budget/2018_Budget_
 Recommendations.pdf 
167 Chicago Police Department. 2017. “Special Order S03-04-04.” Chicago Police Department http
 ://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57bf0-13ed7140-08513-ed71-4ce
 cd9c378c05dec.html 
168 LeCates, Rich. 2018. “Intelligence-led Policing: Changing the Face of Crime Prevention.” Police Chief online 
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/changing-the-face-crime-prevention/ 
169 FBI. 2017. “Table 78.” Crime in the United States https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/ crime-in-the-u.s.-
2017/tables/table-78/table-78.xls/view 
170 Ibid. 
171 Cordeiro, Monivette. May 2019. “A record 75 million people visited Orlando in 2018.” Orlando Weekly 
https://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2019/05/10/a-record-75-million-people-visited-orlando-in-2018  





their agency, allowing for the creation of a Special Enforcement Division that will be focused on 
intelligence led policing to “prevent and reduce crime”173. 
Findings 
As a part of the case study, I utilize data collected by the University of Maryland and the 
New America. The University of Maryland has created the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START) program. As a part of the START program, they created the Global 
Terrorism Database that collects information on terrorism globally from 1970 through 2017174. 
Data is not added to the database unless the credibility of the reporting source has been 
confirmed.  START contains data “on over 180,000 terrorist attacks”175. The database created by 
START is also the “most comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist attacks in the world” 
and was created so terrorism can be “readily studied and defeated”176. While selecting terrorism 
criteria for a database search, I selected terrorism criteria to include acts that are outside of 
legitimate warfare activities, to achieve a political, economic, religious, or social goal with 
evidence that it was intended to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to a larger audience 
beyond the immediate victims of the acts177. The Global Terrorism Database provided by 
START is open to the public and is not directly reported to any law enforcement or government 
agency.  
New America is a think tank that employs academics and policy experts to assemble 
research on issues faced by the modern United States. As a result of this, New America created 
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an “up-to-date source of online information about terrorist activity in the United States and by 
Americans overseas since 9/11”178. New America collected data not only on people who have 
been criminally charged for successful terror attacks for this source, but also collected data on 
people who have been charged for attacks that were not completed179. This is important because 
it paints a more accurate picture of the number of attempted counterterrorism acts, where many 
such terrorist plans were prevented by law enforcement on the federal, state, or local level. The 
data provided by New America is also open to the public and not directly reported to any law 
enforcement or government agency.  
The data provided by the START program by the University of Maryland implies that 
intelligence led policing is an effective method for countering terrorism in the United States180. I 
conducted a comparative case study of five local law enforcement agencies in the United States 
based on this data, comparing terrorist attacks between 1982 to 1999 and 2000 to 2017. The 
results are as follows: 
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As demonstrated by the START data, in the 17 years leading up to 9/11, New York City had 67 
terrorist attacks, Los Angeles had 11, Las Vegas had one, Chicago had seven, and Orlando had 
zero181. In the 17 years following 9/11, New York City had 32 terrorist attacks, Los Angeles had 
three, Las Vegas had six, Chicago had two, and Orlando had one182.  
 Three out of the five local law enforcement agencies studied (New York City, Los 
Angeles, and Chicago) saw a decrease in the amount of terror attacks perpetrated since 9/11183. 
However, two out of the five local law enforcement agencies studied (Las Vegas and Orlando) 
saw an increase in the amount of terror attacks perpetrated since 9-11184. It should be noted that 
all five local law enforcement agencies studied have implemented some level of intelligence led 
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 With Las Vegas and Orlando demonstrating an increase in terror attacks post 9/11 even 
though they have implemented intelligence led policing, it seems there may be a more significant 
variable related to whether intelligence led policing is an effective counterterrorism method in 
the United States or not. Upon further investigation of these five agencies, a relationship was 
noticed between the cities that saw a decrease in terror attacks post 9/11 and their budgets. The 
three cities that saw a decrease in terror attacks post 9/11 have budgets in the billions, whereas 
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When analyzing the employees per capita and budget per capita between the police departments 
as possible more significant variables, it was found that the cities that did not see increases in 
terror attacks had a larger amount of employees and larger budgets per capita compared to the 
cities that did see increases in terror attacks. New York Police Department had 0.00647 
employees per capita for their population, 0.00084 employees per capita for their tourist 
population, and 0.00075 employees per capita for their combined population. The Los Angeles 
Police Department had 0.00321 employees per capita for their population, 0.00026 employees 
per capita for their tourist population, and 0.00024 employees per capita for their combined 
population. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department had 0.00331 employees per capita 
for their population, 0.00013 employees per capita for their tourist population, and 0.00012 
employees per capita for their combined population. Chicago Police Department had 0.00501 
employees per capita for their population, 0.00024 employees per capita for their tourist 
population, and 0.00022 employees per capita for their combined population. The Orlando Police 
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capita for their tourist population, and 0.00001 employees per capita for their combined 
population. Similarly, the New York Police Department had $658.82 per capita for their 
population, $858.90 per capita for their tourist population, and $75.98 per capita for their 
combined population. The Los Angeles Police Department had $399.29 per capita for their 
population, $32 per capita for their tourist population, and $29.63 per capita for their combined 
population. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department had $369.38 per capita for their 
population, $14.27 per capita for their tourist population, and $13.74 per capita for their 
combined population. The Chicago Police Department had $551.33 per capita for their 
population, $25.90 per capita for their tourist population, and $24.74 per capita for their 
combined population. Orlando Police Department had $619.03 per capita for their population, 
$2.34 per capita for their tourist population, and $2.34 per capita for their combined population. 
Based upon this information, no matter how effective intelligence led policing may be as a 
method to counter terrorism on its own, it appears it cannot be effectively implemented by 
agencies with smaller budgets and number of employees. Based upon this information, no matter 
how effective intelligence led policing may be as a method to counter terrorism on its own, it 
appears it cannot be effectively implemented by agencies with smaller budgets and number of 
employees. 
Data from New America also supports that intelligence led policing is an effective 
counter terrorism method, but on a national scale. The New America data asserts that 425 people 
were charged with engaging in jihadist terrorism, or related activities185. This data includes 







these activities abroad, and people who died the year they were charged for these activities186. 
This same data states that 48% of jihadists are monitored by an informant, 24% of jihadists were 
implicated by a tip from family members or the community, and 9% of jihadists were implicated 
by a tip from the general public187. This means that law enforcement agencies are obtaining 
information on 81% of jihadists from members of their community188.  
At face value, it does appear that intelligence led policing is an effective counter 
terrorism method. However, it does appear that budget may be connected to the effectiveness 
rate of intelligence led policing in certain cities. Which means, if true, those law enforcement 
agencies that do not have large budgets will not be able to effectively implement intelligence led 
policing. This would be due to the previously mentioned lack of resources, funding, training, and 
manpower189 190 191 192. It appears the question that needs to be answered may not be if 
intelligence led policing is an effective counter terrorism method as it currently stands, but if it is 
an effective method for counter terrorism in a nation with a decentralized local law enforcement 
structure that is not funded by the federal government.  
Conclusion 
Overall, it appears that intelligence led policing post-9/11 is an effective counter 
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date. The greatest challenge facing local law enforcement agencies in the effective 
implementation of intelligence led policing is its cost. For many agencies that have smaller 
budgets, the implementation of intelligence led policing can be a financial burden. Those same 
agencies that are unable to afford the resources, training, and staff required to implement 
intelligence led policing effectively are also less likely to utilize their local fusion centers 
regularly as they do not have training on how to use this resource or what to do with the 
information gained from it. A federal grant program to assist local law enforcement agencies in 
bridging their funding gap to effectively implement intelligence led policing would likely be an 
effective solution for those cities that have difficulty implementing it. The Department of 
Homeland Security already has a grant program for fiscal year 2020 called the “Targeted 
Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program”193. However, this program relies on 
competitive grant proposals to determine grant funding and it is available to “State, local, tribal, 
and territorial governments (including agencies and departments of those governments), 
nonprofits, and institutions of higher education”194. This grant program is problematic because it 
does not provide funding to agencies who demonstrate the greatest need for funding in order to 
effectively implement intelligence led policing. The Department of Homeland Security’s grant 
program is also problematic because the grant proposals are geared towards “assist[ing] in 
developing a nationwide prevention framework to combat targeted violence and terrorism…”, 
which would prevent agencies from utilizing the grant funding to hire analysts or provide 
intelligence led policing training to current agency staff195. Similarly, the creation of a national 
standard for intelligence led policing, at minimum training on how to utilize the fusion centers 
 








effectively, would also be an effective solution for those cities that have difficulty implementing 
intelligence led policing effectively, such as a definition similar to the one provided earlier in this 
paper.  
Chapter 2: Intelligence Led Policing in the Five Eyes Community 
Introduction 
 Global terrorism is far from being anything new, but since the attacks on September 11, 
2001, it has become a normal part of life for many people. As a result of the attacks, many 
governments enacted national security measures and tasked different law enforcement agencies 
to safeguard the security of their homeland. However, the role of law enforcement in 
counterterrorism extends beyond federal agencies with nationwide jurisdiction. It also lies in the 
hands of local law enforcement personnel that encounter their community regularly. Countries 
with decentralized law enforcement structures, such as the United States, where local law 
enforcement agencies are far removed from federal agencies, tend to experience issues relating to 
funding initiatives like intelligence led policing. It is for this reason that countries with more 
centralized law enforcement structures would be more likely to experience success with 
implementing intelligence led policing as a counterterrorism method.  
Methodology 
To assess if intelligence led policing is an effective counter terrorism option in the Five 
Eyes community, I conducted a comparative case study of its five member states. The member 
states selected for this case study were Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. These member states provide a large population sample that includes 





For this case study, I used START data from the University of Maryland that tracked the 
number of terror attacks that occurred worldwide from 1970-2017196. The data samples for this 
case study were from 1982 to 1999 and 2000 to 2017. The data was broken at 1999/2000 as 
intelligence led policing did not truly come into fruition in some Five Eyes community member 
states as a policing or counter terrorism method until after the attacks on 9/11. The definition of 
terrorism utilized to collect this terrorism data was that terrorism is an act, outside of legitimate 
warfare activities, to achieve a political, economic, religious, or social goal with evidence that it 
was intended to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to a larger audience beyond the 
immediate victims of the act197. 
Case Study 
 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States are all a part 
of an international intelligence sharing group called the Five Eyes Community. The Five Eyes 
Community allows the free flow of intelligence information between all of its member states. It 
is also important to note that these member states are culturally similar and have had similar 
experiences with terrorism. Since September 11, 2001, all five of the member states’ law 
enforcement agencies have implemented intelligence led policing on some level.  
Australia 
Australia has its own federal police force, along with local law enforcement agencies for its 
states. Local law enforcement is responsible for enforcing the laws of that state, along with the 
laws of the country. This is similar to the structure of the United States. Australia has a similar 
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counter radicalization program to the United Kingdom’s Prevent Strategy. Their federally funded 
program also relies on law enforcement and the community to refer any citizens that are at risk 
for radicalization to their intervention programs198. However, the government funds these 
intervention programs with their Live Safe Together Grants Programme199. This allows 
organizations within the community to take charge of the deradicalization process, instead of the 
government200.  
Canada 
Canada has its own federal police force, along with local law enforcement agencies for its 
provinces. Local law enforcement is responsible for enforcing the laws of that province, along 
with the laws of the country. This is similar to the structure of the United States. Canada’s threat 
level has remained at “medium” since 2016201. This threat level, however, only means there is a 
potential for a violent act of terrorism to occur in Canada202. The large majority of cases of 
radicalization to extremism Canada faces center around foreign fighters. As such, Canada has 
been slowly lagging behind their Five Eyes peers when it comes to counter-radicalization 
policies203. On the federal level, Canadian agencies are focused on intelligence and law 
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enforcement operations204. On the local level, Canadian agencies are focused on community 
outreach and proactivity205. As a result of Canada not meeting local needs, Canadian 
municipalities have created their own programs to counter radicalization to violent extremism206. 
Montreal created the Center for the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence207. The Center for 
the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence focuses on educating members of the community 
about the warning signs of radicalization to violent extremism and endeavors to identify at-risk 
individuals in the community as a result208. Calgary created the Re-Direct Program209. The Re-
Direct Program has targeted Canadian youths in an attempt stop the radicalization process before 
it even has the chance to take effect210. The program takes referrals from concerned persons in 
the community on citizens who are vulnerable to radicalization to violent extremism211. Then, 
the program assesses the vulnerable person’s vulnerabilities, taking into consideration their 
“background, family and any other relevant information”212.  
New Zealand 
New Zealand has a national police force called the New Zealand Police. This law enforcement 
agency is responsible for enforcing New Zealand’s laws throughout the country. However, New 
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Zealand does not have local law enforcement agencies, unlike the other Five Eyes member 
states. There is little published about New Zealand’s counter radicalization strategies. However, 
it is known that they actively participate in the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism 
Committee and the United Nations in order to establish better counter radicalization strategies 
for the future213 214.  
The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom was the first of the Five Eyes member states to implement intelligence led 
policing prior to the attacks on September 11, 2001. The United Kingdom has its own federal 
police force, along with territorial law enforcement agencies for its states. Territorial law 
enforcement is responsible for enforcing the laws of that territory, along with the laws of the 
country. However, the law enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom do have cross 
jurisdictional powers that extend beyond the territory they are serving. The United Kingdom has 
implemented their Prevent Strategy in order to counter radicalization and terrorism in their 
country, but it is a federally funded and locally implemented strategy215. Prevent focuses on 
building relationships with communities within the United Kingdom and utilizing those 
relationships to gain tips about people who may have become radicalized216. The United 
Kingdom also has a Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit that “removed more than 55,000 
pieces of online terrorist material in 2015”217. The Prevent Strategy also tasks local law 
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enforcement and school officials with reporting any activity that may indicate a person is at risk 
of becoming radicalized. However, this strategy has received many criticisms. Among these 
criticisms are the targeting of Muslim communities and the inclusion of sympathizers in their 
targeting strategy218. In 2015, approximately 70% of the referrals to the Prevent program were 
related to Islamic extremism219. This may be a result of a legitimate uptick in Islamic 
radicalization, or it may be the result of a cultural bias within the United Kingdom against 
Muslim communities. Furthermore, by including nonviolent radicals and sympathizers in the 
group of people targeted by Prevent, they are potentially also infringing on legitimate political 
activity220.  
The United States 
The United States has its own federal police agencies, along with state law enforcement agencies 
for its states. State law enforcement is responsible for enforcing the laws of that state, along with 
the laws of the country. The United States also has local law enforcement agencies that are 
responsible for enforcing local ordinances for their city or county on top of enforcing their state 
and federal laws. The United States does not implement a nationally standardized strategy for 
intelligence led policing or counterterrorism. The only nationally standardized program created 
and used by the United States has been the National Incident Management System and the 
Incident Command System. Fusion Centers were created in the United States in an effort to 
increase transparency among local, state, and federal agencies. However, restricting intelligence 
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operations only out of fusion centers limits the ability of agencies to gather and share 
intelligence221. Unfortunately, law enforcement officers rarely receive intelligence from the 
fusion centers, even though patrol officers would benefit the most from the information222. The 
utilization of these fusion centers was supposed to, ideally, allow agencies that have limited 
resources to implement intelligence led policing effectively223. Instead, local law enforcement 
agencies are some of the least likely to utilize fusion centers.Another key issue with the emphasis 
on the utilization of fusion centers is that they tend to be located and focused on major urban 
areas in the United States. As such, local law enforcement agencies that are located in urban 
areas are more likely to utilize fusion centers that those located in rural areas224. 
Findings 
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Between 1982 and 1999, Australia had 41 terror attacks, Canada had 32, New Zealand had 5, the 
United Kingdom had 1858, and the United States had 698. Contrastingly, between 2000 and 
2017, Australia had 44 terror attacks, Canada had 50, New Zealand had 11, the United Kingdom 
had 1023, and the United States had 443. Strangely, the United Kingdom and the United States 
were the only two countries to see decreases in the number of terror attacks in their countries 
following the implementation of intelligence led policing. That being said, the increases were 
only marginal compared to the significant decreases of the other two states. The findings of this 
data allude to the fact that implementation of intelligence led policing alone is not a significant 
enough variable to explain the number of terror attacks in any particular time frame. Instead, it 
seems that not only are other variables in play, but that they may have a more significant role in 
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conjunction with intelligence led policing. It also seems from this data that the centralized versus 
decentralized structure of law enforcement agencies in these states have little to no impact on the 
implementation of intelligence led policing and terror attacks during a particular time frame. The 
country with the most decentralized law enforcement structure, the United States, saw one of the 
greatest decreases in terror attacks following the implementation of intelligence led policing. 
Perhaps other variables that should be considered in future case studies would be funding and 
how long intelligence led policing had been implemented in a country for a particular period of 
time.  
Conclusion 
 Counterterrorism has been at the forefront of global priorities, especially since September 
11, 2001, and especially in the Five Eyes Community. One of the steps that these countries and 
their local communities have taken to counter terrorism is the implementation of intelligence led 
policing. This serves to interrupt the radicalization process by working with the community. 
Local law enforcement agencies in the United States have found it difficult to implement 
intelligence led policing effectively due to lack of funding and training that is primarily the result 
of being far removed from the federal government. In theory, this meant the opposite would 
occur in countries that have more centralized law enforcement structures, like the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. However, as the findings of the case study 
show, it seems the level of how centralized a country’s law enforcement structure is seems to be 
unrelated to, or at least minimally impacts, the number of terror attacks in these countries since 
the implementation of intelligence led policing. Other variables to consider for future testing 
would include population size and the number of law enforcement agencies in each country. The 





than New Zealand, for example. Another factor to consider is government involvement in 
intervention programs. Programs from the United States and United Kingdom have received 
criticism due to cultural biases, but Australia allows community organizations to implement 
intervention programs with government grants. As for intelligence led policing, it has been 
criticized for racial bias as well, but has typically been viewed as an effective method of overall 
policing. Perhaps creating community partnerships with the whole community, instead of 
targeting specific cultural or racial groups, will allow for this to be a more effective strategy 
against terrorism in the future. Furthermore, all of the countries in the case study faced similar 
difficulties with transparency and how to define terrorism, radicalization, and intelligence led 
policing. It should be the goal of these individual countries, or together in the Five Eyes 
Community, or standardize these terms. The data used in this paper was unbiased but, limited. 
Unfortunately, there are still few academics that actively measure or study terrorism activity. 
Future studies may want to use a greater amount of data, if it is available. 
Chapter 3: Islamic State Propaganda and Intelligence Led Policing 
Introduction 
 Between 2013 and 2014, there has been an increase of terrorist propaganda on social 
media, particularly by the Islamic State. As such, this development has turned the Internet and 
social media into one of the fastest growing breeding grounds to radicalize citizens for the 
group’s cause. Much of the propaganda has been directed towards Western populations to serve 
two different purposes. These purposes are to both garner fear and attention from Western 
populations, as well as recruit potential foreign fighters to join their organization. This research 
project seeks to analyze the methods in which the Islamic State publishes propaganda on social 





fighters that originate from Western states, as well as how intelligence led policing can be 
utilized by law enforcement to reduce terrorist propaganda online and radicalization to violence 
amongst citizens in their communities.    
Intelligence Led Policing 
 As a solution to the occurrence of radicalization to violence of foreign fighters and 
jihadists in general, separate from social media, is the widespread implementation of versions of 
intelligence led policing in Western states. In Canada, for example, Montreal created the Center 
for the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence226. The Center for the Prevention of 
Radicalization to Violence focuses on educating members of the community about the warning 
signs of radicalization to violent extremism and endeavors to identify at-risk individuals in the 
community as a result227. This program also has created a 24/7 hotline for members of the 
community to utilize228. Calgary created the Re-Direct Program229. The Re-Direct Program has 
targeted Canadian youths in an attempt stop the radicalization process before it even has the 
chance to take effect230. The program takes referrals from concerned persons in the community 
on citizens who are vulnerable to radicalization to violent extremism231. Then, the program 
assesses the vulnerable person’s vulnerabilities, taking into consideration their “background, 
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family and any other relevant information”232. Local law enforcement agencies have also 
continued to implement intelligence led policing as they have the most experience interacting 
with violent extremist behavior and the rest of their communities233. In support of this, 53% of 
jihadists that were captured in the United States from 9/11 to present were taken into custody as 
a result of an informant in their community and 23% were taken into custody as a result of a tip 
provided by family members or the community234. As observed in the findings of this research, 
the role that online propaganda from internet mujahideen on social media platforms only account 
for a portion of citizens that were radicalized to violence. Thus, it is also important to build 
relationships between law enforcement and local communities to also address the issue of 
radicalization from family or the community. 
Implementing Intelligence Led Policing Online to Fight Terrorist Propaganda 
Even though intelligence led policing is often a solution to combat terrorists in general, 
outside of social media, it can be employed online to fight terrorist propaganda. Intelligence led 
policing has a role in combatting terrorist propaganda because tips about potential terrorist 
internet activity is frequently received by submissions from the local community. For example, 
units such as the United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit have been effective 
in removing online terrorist propaganda material235. Such units utilize a different version of 
intelligence led policing in the virtual realm. Citizens are encouraged by law enforcement to 
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subsequently removed by the specialized unit236. This is similar to conventional intelligence led 
policing that relies on citizens to report any potential terrorist activity to law enforcement in their 
communities. The implementation of such specialized units that utilize online intelligence led 
policing on local or national levels would likely be effective in fighting in terrorist propaganda 
from the Islamic State, as well as similar groups. 
Methodology 
 For this research project, two datasets were utilized from the New America Foundation 
that address the radicalization of jihadists on social media. Utilizing these datasets, I conducted a 
comparative case study between the percentage of total jihadists that were radicalized online 
from 2013 to 2019 and the percentage of foreign fighters that were radicalized online from 2013 
to 2019. The comparative case study aims to assess the influence of Islamic State propaganda 
published on social media on the radicalization of foreign fighters from Western states.  
Findings 
 From 2013 to present, social media platforms have played a significant role in 
disseminating propaganda for the Islamic State, as well as radicalizing potential new members 
for the organization. Even in the instances in which jihadists were radicalized due in part to a 
personal connection with a family member or friend that were radicalized, many were still 
contacted or partially radicalized online as well. The figure below represents the percentage of 








Assuming that approximately one third of the jihadists that were radicalized online are foreign 
fighters from Western states, the figure below represents the percentage of foreign fighters that 
have been radicalized online from 2013 to present238. 
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Comparatively, the percentage of overall jihadists that have been radicalized online between 
2013 to present has been significantly larger than the percentage of foreign fighters that have 
been radicalized online between 2013 to present.  
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Furthermore, the Twitter Census data had similar findings, determined both by 
geolocation from location enabled Twitter user accounts and profile information that the majority 
of Islamic State online are from states located in the Middle East, whereas supporters from the 
West accounted for very small percentages242.  In fact, supporters from Iraq, Syria, and Saudi 
Arabia accounted for more than half of the geolocated location enabled accounts (55%). 
Comparatively, the percentage from Western states that were sampled to geolocate location 
enabled Twitter user accounts that support the Islamic State was nominal (France: 0.006891%, 
Brazil: 0.004594%, United Kingdom: 0.002297%, Australia: 0.002297%, and Belgium: 
0.002297%)243. Twitter users whose locations were determined based off profile information 
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were also predominantly from Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (50.36%)244. Contrastingly, the 
United States only accounted for 11.14% of users, while the United Kingdom only accounted for 
3.83% of users245.  
Based upon the findings of both New America datasets and the Twitter Census data, it 
appears that while the Islamic State’s propaganda may target Western populations to garner 
public attention, it does not appear they are particularly successful at recruiting foreign fighters 
as a result of the propaganda material that the Islamic State internet mujahideen posts on social 
media platforms. Familial or community ties to jihadism may still be a better predicting variable 
to determine the probability of a Western citizen radicalizing to violence as a foreign fighter in 
support of the Islamic State when compared to those radicalized online. The New America 
Foundation determined that the percentage of foreign fighters that have familial or community 
ties to jihadism was approximately one third246. Of that third of foreign fighters, approximately 
two thirds of fighters have a relative that is already fighting in support of jihad in the Middle East 
and one third of fighters have a connection through marriage247.  
However, taking into consideration that the propaganda disseminated on social media 
platforms may not be the most effective method to radicalize and recruit foreign fighters, it 
should be noted that this is not the dominant goal of the propaganda dissemination by the Islamic 
State’s internet mujahideen. It is important to remember that the Islamic State is first and 
foremost a foreign terrorist organization. Therefore, their primary goal in disseminating 
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attention from Western populations but, to also strike fear into and terrorize those same 
populations the propaganda is directed towards. Case in point, more positive propaganda, such as 
provision of humanitarian aid and utilities to those who resided within Islamic State controlled 
territory, was rarely disseminated on social media platforms like Twitter. In contrast, more 
appalling propaganda videos that struck fear and outrage in Western populations, such as the 
video of the burning of the Jordanian pilot, have been more widely distributed on social media 
platforms, as well as mass media.   
Solutions 
Removal from Mainstream Social Media Platforms 
The actions of mainstream social media platforms and governments to push Islamic State 
users off of their services appears to possibly be the most effective solution to eradicate Islamic 
State propaganda from social media. The Global Research Network on Terrorism and 
Technology conducted a study in July 2019 that found that radical groups do not necessarily 
thrive when they are removed from mainstream social media platforms. This study utilized the 
far-right group known as Britain First as an example. According to the study, Britain First 
previously amassed a following of approximately 1.8 million followers on Facebook. However, 
when Britain First was banned from Facebook, they relocated to a lesser known platform, Gab, 
where they have subsequently only garnered a following of approximately 11,181. Taking the 
results of this study into consideration, it appears that forcing groups like the Islamic State off of 
mainstream social media platforms would aid significantly in preventing propaganda 





However, this solution is frequently critiqued by free speech advocates and those in the 
intelligence community for a variety of reasons. Among free speech advocates, the concern 
centers around the divide between expressing a person’s personal beliefs and those that have 
truly been radicalized to violence. Such advocates also generally express support of social media 
conglomerates not being liable for the individual posts of individual user accounts. Such removal 
also opens up the possibility of account removal based off of racial and religious biases, as 
previously warned by Jackson and Prunckun248 249. However, even though the First Amendment 
must be considered when persuading social media platform providers to engage in such as push 
to remove Islamic State supporting accounts – along with Section 320 of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 that states “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider” – the United States’ government agencies may gain support from Section 2339B of 
Title 18 of the U.S. Code that prohibits the material support to foreign terrorist organizations250 
251. Uncooperative social media platforms may be determined to be in violation of Section 2339B 
should the acquisition of user accounts by foreign terrorist organizations, along with any refusal 
to remove their content, be considered material support by the United States government252. 
Thus, permitting the removal of such accounts without fear of First Amendment violations. 
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Similarly, members of the intelligence community have concerns over the removal of 
Islamic State supporting user accounts from Twitter and other mainstream social media 
platforms due to the intelligence value of the information contained on the accounts and the 
possible ramifications of isolating the group to less popular social media platforms. The user 
accounts that support the Islamic State on social media platforms offer valuable intelligence 
information from the propaganda that they distribute. The propaganda postings themselves, 
although heavily biased, do provide insights to conditions and events within the Islamic State 
community. They can also provide valuable location information on geotagged posts on location 
enabled social media accounts, along with member information based off of their networks of 
friends and followers on the social media websites. While there are potential ramifications to 
isolating Islamic State supporting users to lesser known social media platforms such as 
previously mentioned Telegram, RocketChat, and ZeroNet to plan events with more strongly 
radicalized members, it is an activity that the Islamic State has already been conducting. The 
Islamic State has already utilized social media platforms like telegram to plan attacks and publish 
propaganda information for members to distribute amongst their own, individual, social media 
accounts. Thus, due to the diminished overall presence of Islamic State supporters on social 
media as a result of their removal from mainstream platforms, the probability that their activity 
on lesser known platforms would increase or become more radicalized appears to be low. 
Conclusion 
 Hence, it is therefore concluded by this research that counterterrorism efforts by law 
enforcement agencies in relation to social media platforms should focus on the aforementioned 
push to remove the Islamic State from mainstream social media platforms in lieu of the failure of 





media platforms and community programs would likely greatly reduce the already small 
percentage of foreign fighters originating from Western states. It should be noted that such action 
would likely have minimal impacts on intelligence gathering capabilities or event planning 
conducted by radicals due to their already implemented use of Telegram and social media 
platforms that have decentralized data stores. Law enforcement agencies can create designated 
units to implement intelligence led policing online in order to fight counter radicalization to 
violence among citizens in their community, like the previously mentioned United Kingdom’s 
Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit. Such methods have already been employed on the 
federal level by the FBI when they captured Hosam Smadi due to his posts on the internet in 
reference to radicalization to violence and mounting an imminent terrorist attack253. Such models 
could be employed on local levels to increase efficiency and effectiveness.  
So What? And Final Conclusion 
 It is apparent that law enforcement models are needed to acclimate and adapt to 
international and domestic terrorist threats. It is important to create and support academic 
literature for all levels of law enforcement whether tribal, local, state, or federal. Similarly, it is 
important to create and support academic literature for different theatres whether domestic, 
international, or in cyberspace. Furthermore, it should be noted that cyberspace is possibly the 
next large war theatre and it is equally important to implement intelligence led policing online by 
all levels of law enforcement to aid in the prevention of radicalization to violence among citizens 
in their community.  
 






 Furthermore, the United States would likely benefit from a more centralized model of 
intelligence led policing that bears greater similarities to their Five Eyes Community partners. A 
possible, more ideal, intelligence led policing model for law enforcement agencies in the United 
States would place more focus on standardization, training, and funding sources for tribal, local, 
and state agencies. In this model, a task force composed of geographically representative law 
enforcement agencies would create a single, uniform definition of intelligence led policing to be 
utilized by law enforcement agencies across the United States. The federal government would 
create grant programs that not only seek innovations in countering terrorism but, to bridge 
resource gaps in agencies that lack the appropriate resources to effectively implement 
intelligence led policing on the local level. The federal government would also create 
standardized, easily accessible, training programs containing information on how to utilize 
fusion centers as well as to train patrol officers in an intelligence capacity, similar to the Phoenix 
model254. Such changes are likely to lead to an increase in effectiveness of intelligence led 
policing as a countering terrorism method and should be a topic within future research.  
 In order to bridge the training and resource gap between patrol and fusion centers when 
implementing intelligence led policing, local law enforcement agencies should adhere to set 
standardized policies. These policies would bear similarity to the Phoenix model255, with some 
minor alterations. Upon receiving a standardized training program on a state or federal level, 
local law enforcement agencies should designate one patrol officer per shift, and per district or 
precinct, to act as intelligence liaison officers. For example, if there are four shifts (alpha, bravo, 
charlie, and delta) and there are five districts or precincts, then there would be 20 intelligence 
 
254 Telep, Cody W., Justin Ready, and Johannes Bottema. 2017. “Working Towards Intelligence Led Policing: The 






liaison officers for the agency. These officers would be the designated users of intelligence 
databases for each shift and would bridge the information gap with the local fusion centers. 
Implementing such a policy would allow intelligence liaison officers to relay important 
intelligence information from their local fusion center to patrol officers, as well as relay local 
intelligence information from patrol back to the fusion center. Also, due to dual training patrol 
officers as intelligence liaison officers, it would reduce associated costs of implementing 
intelligence led policing for local law enforcement agencies as it would eliminate the need for a 
robust intelligence unit occupied by civilian intelligence analysts.  
Moreover, it has been determined by this paper that even though intelligence led policing 
may become the most effective tool in fighting terrorism, agency implementation of intelligence 
led policing alone is not a strong enough variable to determine effectiveness. In fact, other 
variables may have a stronger causal relationship with intelligence led policing and 
effectiveness, such as budget and employees per capita as touched upon within the first chapter 
in this paper. This paper is intended to act as a building block for future research in the field of 
intelligence led policing and countering terrorism. 
Future Research 
 While intelligence led policing as a method on its own appears to be effective as a 
counter terrorism method, there is a significant lack of research in relation to intelligence led 
policing, let alone intelligence led policing as it relates to countering terrorism. Other variables to 
consider for future research would include the number of law enforcement agencies per country, 
budget, and government involvement in intervention, as well as training programs. Furthermore, 
intelligence led policing lacks a standardized definition on national and global levels. In future 





intelligence led policing. Such standardized definition will not only aid in consistency in 
academia but, will aid in the effective uniform implementation of intelligence led policing by 
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